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Macroeconomic adjustment programs often emphasize the need to protect social spending
from cuts, and to protect pro-poor spending in particular. But does this happen in practice
during fiscal contractions? The paper presents evidence for Argentina. Using aggregate
time series data the paper first finds that social spending was not protected historically,
although more “pro-poor” social spending was no more vulnerable. Turning next to new
data for an externally-financed workfare scheme introduced in response to a macro crisis,
the paper finds that this program was far better targeted than other social spending. However,
it appears that the program still had to assure that a small but relatively well-protected
share of its benefits went to the non-poor. This appears to be a political economy constraint.
JEL classification codes:  E62, H22, I38
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I. Introduction
It is now common for macroeconomic adjustment programs to call for a
pro-poor shift in the composition of public spending — in combination with
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an overall fiscal contraction, as usually called for to assure macro stability.1
Donors have been particularly keen to support new public anti-poverty
programs and “social funds” that claim to target extra assistance to the poor
at times of crisis and adjustment.
The case for such action to protect pro-poor social spending rests on the
answers to a number of questions: Do cuts tend to fall more heavily on the
social services that matter most to the poor? When cuts are borne by the poor,
do they gain similarly from expansions? Do add-on “crisis programs” help
the poor?  What happens when such programs are also cut?
The literature has offered little guidance on the answers. One theoretical
argument that has been made is that targeting spending to the poor can
undermine political support for the taxation needed to finance that spending;
the poor might even end up worse off (Gelbach and Pritchett, 1997; De Donder
and Hindriks, 1998).2 However, broad political support for greater targeting
is possible when there is an exogenously imposed spending cut, which brings
tax savings to the non-poor (Ravallion, 1999a). Even when the poor have no
power over how cuts are implemented, it is theoretically possible that they
will be protected from cuts without further intervention. The outcome depends
on the preferences of those in power, notably the extent to which they gain
directly from public spending on the poor, and (less obviously) how quickly
the marginal utility of their spending on the poor declines relative to the
marginal utility of spending on themselves (Ravallion, 1999a). Nor is it clear
that the poor will be powerless even when they are a minority. They may be
able to form a small but influential special interest group, represented by
Non-Governmental Organizations, or they may be able to form a coalition
with non-poor sub-groups who see it as in their interests to not have the burden
of cuts fall on the poor. Even when the poor are a relatively powerless minority,
1 See for example the World Bank’s recent adjustment loan to Argentina (World Bank,
1998). Also see the discussion in Lustig (2000).
2 Also see the discussions in Besley and Kanbur (1993), Sen (1995) and van de Walle
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the incidence of cuts is unclear on a priori grounds given the external costs of
poverty to non-poor people (Ravallion, 2000a).
Argentina provides an interesting case study for investigating these issues
empirically. The country has undergone a number of sharp fiscal contractions
over the last two decades. And good data are now available for studying the
impacts of aggregate fiscal contractions on the composition of spending. The
paper studies two very different sources of data. Firstly, the following section
uses aggregate times series data on public spending allocations to see how
the composition of spending changes with aggregate contraction and
expansion. Secondly, the paper turns to a new data set (constructed for the
purpose of this paper) on one of the programs explicitly introduced by the
Government of Argentina (with support from the World Bank) to deal with
the effects of a macro crisis on the poor. Section III describes the program
and how its performance in reaching the poor is to be measured, while section
IV tests how the program’s performance in reaching poor areas was influenced
by spending cuts. Section V offers some conclusions.
II. Social Spending in Argentina during Fiscal Expansions and
Contractions
While methods of measurement differ, it is widely agreed that in the mid-
1990s less than 30% of the population is poor by Argentinean standards (World
Bank, 1999). The level of “social spending” averaged 56% of total government
spending in the period 1980-97 (Government of Argentina, 1999). Less than
half of this went to “social services” (education, health, water and sewerage,
housing and urban development, social assistance, and labor programs); the
remainder can be labeled “social insurance” (pensions, public health insurance,
unemployment insurance). Spending on social services is believed to be pro-
poor, in that the poorest x% of households receive more than x% of spending,
but this is not so for social insurance (Gasparini, 1999; Llach and  Montoya,
1999). Table 1 reproduces recent estimates of the incidence of public spending
on social insurance as distinct from the social services. The results confirm98 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
that social service spending is more pro poor than social insurance. Access to
social insurance in Argentina typically requires that one has a job in the formal
segment of the labor market, which is less than half of the workforce, and
relatively few of the poor (World Bank, 1999).
Table 1. Incidence of  Social Spending and Taxes in Argentina 1996
Shares of spending and taxes attributed to quintiles of households ranked by
income per person:
12 34 5T otal
poorest
Social services 29.8 18.8 21.7 16.8 13.0 100
Social insurance 9.90 20.6 19.5 23.6 26.5 100
Total social spending 21.8 19.5 20.8 19.5 18.4 100
Taxes 7.10 10.7 14.9 20.1 47.2 100
Income shares 4.00 8.40 13.2 21.2 53.2 100
Source: World Bank (1999), quoting Gasparini (1999); estimates for urban Argentina in
1996.
There is evidence that spending on social services in Argentina has
responded more to changes in national income than has social insurance.
Wodon and Hicks (2000) study the effects of changes in GDP on targeted
spending on social services (about 4% of total government spending). They
find that the ratio of targeted public spending to the number of poor had a
positive elasticity (of about three) to GDP; in recessions, there were more
poor people, and less was spent on them.
The political regime is also likely to matter. For a sample of Latin American
countries (including Argentina), Brown and Hunter (1999) find that
democracies are more likely to protect social spending in a recession, but that
authoritarian regimes are more inclined to expand social spending when the99 ARE THE POOR PROTECTED FROM BUDGET CUTS?
crisis is over.3 Argentina has been a democracy since 1983. The data series I
will use start in 1980, and so it is reasonable to ignore the change in regime.
In this setting it is of interest to examine how changes in the government’s
total budget affected the level and composition of social spending. Did budget
cuts have similar effects to budget expansions? Were the categories of spending
that are known to matter to the poor more protected than other types of
spending?
3 This study does not, however, control for the level of total spending, so it is unclear
whether the identified effects operate through the composition of spending or its aggregate
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Figure 1. Total Public Spending and Social Spending in Argentina
1980-97 (changes in logs)
Figure 1 offers a direct test for whether social spending has been protected
from budget cuts. The figure plots the time series of changes in the log of total
public spending (“Gasto Público Consolidado”) and the log of social spending100 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
(both in 1997 prices) as compiled by Government of Argentina (1999) and
covering the period 1980-97.4 Unlike most other compilations of public
spending data, this one includes all levels of government. In this and other
respects, considerable care appears to have gone into constructing the data.
There is clearly little sign that social spending was protected from cuts.
Indeed, there is sizable co-movement, with indications that (if anything) social
spending was more volatile than other types of spending. One can see quite
large proportionate declines in social spending in every year in which total
spending falls. On the other hand, one often sees smaller (and sometimes
negative) changes in social spending when total spending rises.
Let 
S
t G denote social spending at date t, and Gt total spending, one can
test whether the elasticity to an increase in total spending differs from that for
a decrease using the following regression:
t t t t
S
t G G ε + ∆ δ − γ + δ γ + α = ∆ ln )] 1 ( [ ln 2 1
where α is a time trend, γ1 is the elasticity when total spending increases, γ2 is
the  elasticity  when  it  falls,  and  δt = I(∆ ln Gt)  takes  the  value  unity  when
∆ ln Gt > 0 and zero otherwise.
The data in Figure 1 yield an estimate of 0.14 for γ1. This is not significantly
different from zero (the standard error is 0.37). On the other hand, the estimated
elasticity to a decrease in total spending (γ2) is 2.14, which is significantly
greater than one (the standard error is 0.26). Social spending responds
elastically to aggregate cuts, but the responsive to fiscal expansions is not
statistically  significant.5 The  constant  term  of 0.086, which  is  significant
(t-ratio = 2.83), indicating a sizable independent trend increase in the share
(1)
4 Both time series are highly serially correlated; indeed, augmented Dickey-Fuller tests do
not reject the unit root hypothesis for either variable at even the 10% levels. So the following
analysis will focus on changes from year to year rather than levels.
5 The average elasticity (constraining γ1 and γ2 to be equal) is 1.366, with a standard error of
0.21; however, the restriction that γ1 = γ2 performs poorly (t = 3.16).101 ARE THE POOR PROTECTED FROM BUDGET CUTS?
of social spending. By contrast, non-social spending was well protected; the
elasticity when total spending fell was 0.09, and not significantly different
from zero (a standard error of 0.22); on the other hand, the elasticity to an
increase was 1.68 (standard error of 0.41).
While these elasticities are of descriptive interest, their causal interpretation
requires that we believe that changes in total spending are uncorrelated with
the error term εt in (1). To test for the causal effect on social spending, I
assume that the elasticity to higher spending is in fact zero (on the grounds
that the OLS results are so strong that it is difficult to believe they are not
robust in this respect). Under this assumption, I use lagged values of both
social spending and other spending as instruments for cuts in total spending.
(The instruments were jointly significant in the first-stage regression.) The
resulting 2SLS estimate for the elasticity of social spending to a cut in the
total budget is 2.28 with a standard error of 0.27. Again, not only is social
spending not protected, its elasticity to cuts exceeds one, implying a fall in
the share of social spending during fiscal contractions.
This protection of “non-social” spending does not however mean that the
non-poor shift the cuts to the “powerless poor”. Social spending in Argentina
includes types of spending that matter more to the non-poor than the poor,
such as social insurance. Also, there may be pro-poor changes in the
composition of social spending, dampening the marginal impact on the poor.6
To see how the composition of social spending changes with cuts, Table 2
reports estimates of equation (1) for various categories of social spending.
The same pattern is evident in almost all spending components; social spending
responds elastically to cuts in the total budget, but does not respond
significantly to budget increases. The only exception is housing and urban
spending, which does not respond differently to an increase in total spending
versus a decrease, and the coefficient is not significantly different from zero.
The elasticity to budget cuts is very similar for social services as social
6 There is evidence (for India) that spending composition is not homogeneous in the level
of spending (Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1999).102 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Table 2. Elasticities of Social Spending to Total Public Spending in
Argentina
Elasticity to a change in 2SLS
Share of total public spending estimate of
Spending Sub-categories total the elasticity
category spending Increase in Decrease in for a
(%) total total decrease in
spending spending spending
Social insurance 32.38 0.070 2.050* 2.240*
(0.396) (0.368) (0.340)
Social care 21.24 -0.129 2.243* 2.449*
(incl. pensions) (0.533) (0.569) (0.509)
Health 8.36 0.321 1.698 1.773
(0.561) (0.376) (0.438)
Work (incl. 1.88 0.704 2.904* 3.637
unemploy. comp.) (2.068) (0.937) (1.691)
Social services 23.30 0.246 2.255* 2.343*
(0.543) (0.332) (0.389)
Social services 21.43 0.386 2.327* 2.589*
(excl. housing and urban) (0.481) (0.320) (0.367)
Sector classification of social services
Education 11.47 0.270 2.283* 2.328*
(0.591) (0.398) (0.435)
Health 4.83 0.740 2.098* 2.678*
(0.578) (0.333) (0.443)
Housing and urban 1.87 0.444 0.444 0.551
(0.524) (0.524) (1.158)
Social assistance (incl. 1.76 0.377 2.992* 3.650*
family allowances) (0.912) (0.611) (0.797)103 ARE THE POOR PROTECTED FROM BUDGET CUTS?
Employment 0.15 1.698 2.740* 4.515*
programs (1.239) (0.591) (1.355)
Targeted/universal classification of social services
Targeted 4.09 -0.488 2.200* 1.587
(0.876) (0.554) (0.726)
Targeted (excl. 2.22 0.220 3.009* 3.422*
housing and urban) (0.834) (0.568) (0.695)
Universal 19.21 0.398 2.267* 2.505
(0.542) (0.343) (0.402)
Total 55.68 0.138 2.140* 2.277*
(0.368) (0.260) (0.272)
Notes: Regressions of the change in the log of each spending category on the change in the
log of total public spending, with intercepts, estimated on annual data for 1980-97. 2SLS
estimator uses lagged total spending and lagged social spending as the instruments; the
dummy variable for whether total spending has decreased is used as its own instrument.
The F-test for the first stage regression was 4.43, significant at the 3% level. White standard
errors in parentheses; * indicates significantly different from one at the 5% level.
Table 2. (Continued) Elasticities of Social Spending to Total Public
Spending in Argentina
Elasticity to a change in 2SLS
Share of total public spending estimate of
Spending Sub-categories total the elasticity
category spending Increase in Decrease in for a
(%) total total decrease in
spending spending spending104 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
7 The difference between social insurance and social services in the elasticities is not
significant (t = 0.30);  nor  can one reject the null that the parameters are jointly the same
(F = 0.28).
insurance.7 The table also gives the 2SLS estimate of the elasticity to budget
cuts. The most notable difference is that spending on employment programs
becomes highly elastic to cuts; these include the Trabajar Programs we will
study in depth in the next section.
This uniformity in the elasticities to budget cuts between social insurance
and social services is inconsistent with the idea that cuts will simply be passed
onto the categories of spending that matter most to the poor. As we have seen
from Table 1, middle (and upper) income groups are likely to benefit relatively
more from pensions and (formal sector) unemployment compensation than
the poorest quintile. The non-poor might also be expected to resist cuts to
these categories of spending given that formal social insurance spending is
heavily pre-committed, and hence harder to cut. Yet we find that the
proportionate cuts are just as great for social insurance as social services; the
absolute cuts are in fact higher for social insurance, given that it accounts for
a higher share of the budget.
A possible explanation for this result is that the benefits to the non-poor
from social services are tied to consumption by the poor. It is hard to cut
spending on schools without also hurting the non-poor. Inability to finely
target many social services thus helps protect the poor from differentially
higher cuts, even though the non-poor benefit proportionately less from this
type of spending than from social insurance.
This begs the question: did more targeted categories of social services
receive heavier cuts? Government of Argentina (1999) provides a classification
of social service spending according to whether it is “targeted” or “universal”.
The targeted programs are housing and urban programs, social assistance
and employment programs; on average, these account for 17.7% of spending
on social services.  Table 2 also gives the estimates of γ1 and γ2 classified this
way. The elasticity to total spending cuts is not any higher for the targeted105 ARE THE POOR PROTECTED FROM BUDGET CUTS?
components of social services; indeed, if anything, the elasticity is higher for
universal social services.
However, this conclusion is sensitive to the classification of “targeted”
spending.  Table 2 also gives separate estimates for two of the components of
targeted social service spending, namely social assistance and employment.
Both have high elasticities to a fall in total spending. If one excludes housing
and urban from the targeted component we also find a relatively high elasticity.
So these results do offer some support for the conclusion that targeted social
spending is more vulnerable to fiscal contraction.
III. Tracking Expansion and Contraction in an Anti-Poverty
Program
The above results do not suggest that social spending provided a good
safety net for Argentina’s poor at times of fiscal adjustment, given how exposed
that spending was to aggregate cuts, and how little of it went to the poor at
normal times. This provides a strong motivation for looking to alternative
programs that might better reach the poor in a crisis. We shall now study one
such program in depth. The program was picked because of the unusually
rich data available, and the fact that these data cover a period in which the
program both expanded and contracted. We will examine how well the program
performed in reaching the poor in a crisis, and see how its performance changed
with both aggregate expansion and contraction, exploiting the fact that this
happened differently in different provinces.
A. The Trabajar Programs
The Government of Argentina introduced the Trabajar Program in 1996,
in the wake of a sharp rise in unemployment, and evidence that this was
hurting the poor more than others. In May 1997 the unemployment rate for
the poorest decile of households (ranked by household income per capita) in
Greater Buenos Aires was 40% versus 17% on average. The Trabajar Programs
also followed a period of declining social spending (Figure 1).106 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
The program’s aim was to reduce poverty by providing relatively low
wage work on community projects in poor areas. The central government
pays for the wage cost, and local or provincial governments cover the non-
wage costs. Within provincial budget allocations, proposals for sub-projects
compete for central funding according to a points system. Three versions of
the program have been tried since then, Trabajar I, II and III. In terms of
design, Trabajar II (TII) and III are more similar to each other than either are
to Trabajar I (TI). There were substantial design changes between Trabajar I
and II. The inter-provincial allocation of spending was reformed, moving
away from a largely political process to an explicit formula based on the
estimated number of poor unemployed workers in each province. TII also put
greater emphasis on creating assets of value to poor communities. Poverty
measures were included in the center’s budget allocation rules and in the
selection criteria for sub-projects. The poverty focus was also made clearer to
provincial administrators. TIII was very similar to its predecessor in design.
The main difference was that greater emphasis was placed on the quality of
sub-projects, to assure that the assets created were of value to the communities.
The World Bank has supported TII and TIII by loans (disbursed against the
wage payments), and through technical support on program design, monitoring
and evaluation. All results quoted for TIII in this paper relate to the first 16
months of its operation, up to November 1999.
From the point of view of this paper, an important difference between the
three versions of the program is in the level of funding. In Trabajar I,
disbursements by the center (covering wages for participating workers)
averaged $77 million per annum; for TII this rose to $160 million per annum,
and it then fell to $98 million per annum under TIII. As we will see, there
were also differences in levels of funding between sub-periods.
Survey-based impact evaluation methods have been used to assess the
gains to participating workers and their families from TII and TIII. Propensity-
score matching methods were used to construct a comparison group to
surveyed Trabajar participants from an identical national sample survey
implemented at the same time. Income gains were then estimated by comparing107 ARE THE POOR PROTECTED FROM BUDGET CUTS?
incomes of the Trabajar participants with the matched comparison group.
The results have indicated that Trabajar jobs are well targeted to the poor;
Figure 2 gives the concentration curve for worker participation in the program.
This was estimated by locating the families of a random sample of 3,500
Trabajar workers within the national distribution (based on a sample of 22,000
families).8For example, 76% of people living in the households of participating
workers had a household income per capita that placed them amongst the
poorest 20% of Argentineans nationally.
8 Identical surveys were used for the program participants and the national sample, and the
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Figure 2. Concentration Curve of Participation in the
Trabajar II Program
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How does this incidence of income gains compare to other social spending
in Argentina? Table 3 gives the concentration curves for the Trabajar program
and both aggregate social service spending and social insurance, all on a
household basis (to assure that the Trabajar concentration curve is comparable
with the numbers in Table 1). Since there is very little variation in the Trabajar
wage rate, the concentration curve based on participation is also the benefit
incidence curve for gross wage payments.9It can be seen from Table 3 that
the direct income gains from the program were far better targeted than social
insurance and social services as a whole. The program’s targeting also appears
to be better than any other targeted programs in Argentina. Amongst the
programs for which incidence calculations are given in World Bank (1999,
Table 3.7), the next best performance was for programs directed at pregnant
mothers and children, for which 70% of the benefits went to the poorest quintile
of households, which was itself an unusually good performance compared to
other programs.
Of course, targeting performance is only one factor in assessing the
performance of such programs in reducing poverty (Ravallion, 1999b). A
program such as Trabajar is designed to help in one dimension of poverty,
while programs directed at health and nutrition of the poor help in quite
different dimensions; both types of programs can have important roles. Nor
does targeting performance tell us anything about net income gains. Using
propensity score matching methods, Jalan and Ravallion (1999) estimate the
net income gains from the Trabajar program, allowing for foregone income
(mainly from part-time “odd-jobs”). The net income gains to participating
workers represented 50% of the gross wage gains on average (Jalan and
Ravallion, 1999). (Factoring in foregone income mainly affects the
concentration curve below the 20th percentile.)
9 Again this does not net out foregone income, though nor do the standard benefit incidence
calculations in Table 1 take account of behavioral responses. However, as noted above,
factoring in foregone income mainly affects the concentration curve below the 20th percentile
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Table 3. Selected Points on the Concentration Curves
Proportion of
Trabajar households
with an income per
  person that places
them in the poorest
 x % nationally
20 76 30 10
40 92 49 31
60 97 70 50
80 99 87 74
Notes: For comparability with Table 1 the figures for Trabajar participants are households
not people (Figure 2 is people not households). Sources: As for Table 1, except for Trabajar
participation which is from Jalan and Ravallion (1999).
Such calculations relate solely to the benefits from the work provided by
the scheme. There are also indirect benefits from the assets created. While
non-poor people are unlikely to find the Trabajar wage attractive, they would
no doubt like to have the scheme producing things of value in their
communities. (There is negligible cost recovery.) How well did the program
perform in assuring that the work was provided in poor areas?  How did this
change when the program expanded and contracted?
One can monitor the extent to which the program reached poor areas, by
tracking the geographic distribution of disbursements and comparing this to
the poverty map of Argentina.  By doing so within a period of budget expansion
then contraction, and comparing the results across provinces, we will be able
to test for budget effects on this aspect of the programs’ poor-area targeting
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B. Assessing Poor-Area Targeting Performance
Each provincial government’s optimal allocation to a household is
unobserved, but it is assumed to depend on the household’s level of welfare.
That may in turn depend on where the household lives, but I assume that the
poverty rate in the area where it lives does not matter to a household’s allocation
independently of its own level of welfare. In other words, there is no “poor-
area bias” in that a poor person living in a poor local-government area expects
to get the same amount from the program as an equally poor person living in
a rich area of the same province. (The allocations need not be identical, but
only equal in expectation; random deviations are allowed.) The same holds
for the non-poor. This assumption can be thought of as a form of horizontal
equity within provinces (Ravallion, 2000b).
Let us consider how to measure each province’s performance, making
this assumption of horizontal equity in expectation within the province. The
central government allocates a total budget of G per capita across M provinces
such that G
j per capita is received by province j. After that, each province
decides how much should go to the poor versus the non-poor. The chosen
allocation by province j is       per capita for the non-poor and       for the poor.
Province j comprises Mj local government areas, called “departments”. The
per capita allocations to department i (=1,.., Mj ) within province j can be
written as:
                      and
where the ε’s are departmental deviations from province means.
Total disbursements to the poor and non-poor must exhaust the budget.
This creates an accounting identity linking total program expenditure per
capita to the poverty rate in a department. Let Gij denote program spending in
the i’th department of the j’th province, and let the corresponding poverty
rate be Hij — the “headcount index”, given by the proportion of the population
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Using equation (2) we can re-write (3) in the form of a simple linear
regression across all departments in province j:
where
and                              is the absolute difference between the average allocation
to the poor and that to the non-poor in province j. If Tj is negative then the
program favors the non-poor in absolute terms; if Tj  is positive, then the
program favors the poor, and the higher the targeting differential, the more
provincial spending favors the poor.
How can the targeting differential be estimated? Under the horizontal equity
assumption, the error term in (5) has zero mean for any given province and is
uncorrelated with Hij since the ε’s are zero-mean errors within any given
province and are uncorrelated with Hij (and its squared value). Thus Hij is
exogenous in (4) and so one can estimate Tj  from an OLS regression of Gij on
Hij across all departments within a given province.10
Provincial performance in reaching poor areas can thus be measured by
the regression coefficient of spending per capita on the poverty rate, estimated
across all departments in each province. Call this the “targeting differential”
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10 Equation (5) indicates that the error term will not be homoskedastic. Standard errors of
the targeting differential were corrected for heteroscedasticity.112 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
One can similarly define a national inter-departmental targeting differential,
by calculating (6) over all departments nationally (ignoring province
boundaries).
The targeting differential can be interpreted as a measure of absolute
progressivity, namely the difference between per capita spending on the poor
and that on the non-poor. A TD of zero indicates that there is no difference in
Trabajar spending on the poor versus non-poor. A positive TD means that the
program favors poor areas; a negative coefficient means it favors non-poor
areas.  Poverty is measured by the proportion of the population deemed to
have unmet basic needs (UBN), based on the 1991 census.
The overall targeting differentials across all 510 departments were $41,
$110 and $76 per capita for TI, TII and TIII respectively; all three are significant
at the 1% level. To help interpret these numbers, compare the poorest
department, namely Figueroa (in Santiago Del Estero province) where the
incidence of unmet basic needs is 75.5%, with the least poor department,
namely Chacabuco (in Chaco province) where the poverty measure is 3.3%.
The expected difference in spending was $30 under TI, $79 under TII, and
$55 under TIII.
So the expansion to the program between TI and TII was associated with
a more pro-poor allocation of funds geographically, while the contraction
between TII and TIII came with a less pro-poor allocation. Next we will see if
this aggregate correlation is borne out when we compare provinces over times.
IV. Program Spending and Poor-Area Targeting across Provinces
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in the inter-provincial allocation of spending, it is possible to test for
statistically significant effects of fiscal expansion and contraction on the
program’s targeting performance. The better information system for TII and
TIII allows a breakdown of the aggregates into sub-periods by province.
Intervals of five months were chosen. The working paper version of this paper
gives the detailed breakdown of the aggregate targeting differentials by these
intervals, as well as program spending per capita for each five-month period
(Ravallion, 2000a).11
To assess the effect of the cuts on targeting performance, one can regress
the province and period-specific targeting differentials on program spending
per capita across provinces, pooling all five-month periods and all provinces.
The targeting differential will, however, vary across provinces according to
other factors, such as the strength of provincial concern for the poor, how
poor the province is as a whole (Ravallion, 1999c), the history of the provincial
efforts at targeting the poor, and the capabilities of local managers. It is not
implausible that some or all of these variables will also be correlated with
program spending. So their omission will yield a biased estimate of the effect
of cuts on targeting performance. However, this problem can be dealt with by
treating these differences in provincial targeting performance as provincial
fixed effects when estimating the impact of program spending.
Given these considerations, the test for the effect of changes in program
disbursements on targeting performance takes the form of a regression of the
province and date-specific targeting differential on aggregate spending per
capita in the province and a set of province-specific effects. The regression is
thus:
                                              (j = 1, .., 22;  t = 1, 2, 3,..)
11 This is an extended version of the data used in Ravallion (1999). The latter paper only
used data for TII. Adding TIII more than doubles the number of degrees of freedom in the
data.
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where Tjt is the targeting differential for province j at date t, Gjt is spending by
province j at date t, ηj is the province-specific effect and ￿jt is an innovation
error, representing random, idiosyncratic, differences in targeting performance
uncorrelated with spending. As discussed above, the aggregate spending
allocation Gjt is allowed to be endogenous in that it is correlated with the
province effect ηj. It is assumed that cov(Gjt, ￿ jt) = 0. This would not hold if
program spending was adjusted according to targeting performance. However,
this would have been difficult given the timing of data availability. In a meeting
with the program’s central manager and staff it was confirmed that program
spending across provinces had not been adjusted according to indicators of
performance in reaching poor areas within provinces.
This regression can be used to estimate a counter-factual targeting
differential, which controls for differences over time in program spending.
In particular, define the budget-neutral targeting differential as the value of
TD if program spending did not vary over time within provinces, and was
given by the mean spending of TII and TIII. This is identified by simply re-
writing equation (10) as:
Thus Tj
* is the expected value of the budget-neutral targeting differential.
By regressing Tjt on spending expressed as a deviation from the overall (five
month) mean spending per capita for TII and TIII, and a complete set of
province dummy variables, one can then estimate Tj
* by the regression
coefficient on the j’th dummy variable. For example, the coefficient on the
province dummy variable for Cordoba in TII can be interpreted as the estimated
targeting differential for that province under Trabajar II if it had its mean
budget allocation across TII and TIII.
Table 4 gives the results, both for the combined sample and split between
TII and TIII.  When the regressions for TII and TIII are combined, allowing
all coefficients to differ between TII and TIII, a joint test convincingly rejects
the null hypothesis that the budget-neutral TDs are the same for the two
jt
*
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programs. I also tested whether the estimated value of â  was different when
spending increased versus decreased; there was no significant difference (the
coefficient on the interaction effect between Gjt – Gj and I(Gjt – Gj), where I is
the indicator function, had a t-ratio of –0.38).  There is no difference in the
absolute value of the effects of spending cuts versus increases.
Table 4. Budget Effects on Poor-Area Targeting of Argentina’s Trabajar
Programs
                                     Full sample             Trabajar II           Trabajar III
coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio coeffcient t-ratio




Buenos Aires -5.62 -2.50 -8.35 -2.38 -3.78 -0.43
Catamarca  49.48  3.34  20.38  2.12  93.31  9.54
Chaco  10.07  2.13  6.73  0.60  31.11  3.02
Chubut  31.53  3.92  29.89  2.89  39.99  4.46
Cordoba  144.60  10.25  131.35  6.94  161.51  18.35
Corrientes  24.68  4.64  19.16  2.51  41.25  4.38
Entre Rios  15.27  3.12  16.29  1.96  22.68  2.50
Formosa  10.38  1.82  6.54  0.51  26.74  2.81
Jujuy  61.23  4.59  46.80  8.58  92.46  9.28
La Pampa  6.37  1.36  11.15  1.16  8.01  0.89
La Rioja  3.97  0.43 -1.82 -0.09  26.64  2.62
Mendoza  29.98  4.17  34.67  2.50  31.64  3.54
Misiones -2.10 -0.29 -15.69 -1.68  23.62  2.47
Neuquen -8.07 -1.55 -6.32 -0.66  6.79  0.68
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Rio Negro  52.33  4.28  59.11  2.60  54.82  5.97
Salta  67.30  10.81  64.22  6.20  86.70  8.63
San Juan  50.50  6.73  63.15  8.69  48.72  5.23
San Luis  37.08  6.11  30.34  3.55  61.68  5.94
Santa Cruz  9.33  1.21  4.62  0.30  26.50  2.81
Santa Fe  18.52  2.95  30.05  4.23  16.54  1.79
Santiago Del Estero  22.53  3.97  20.09  2.06  43.67  4.12
Tucuman  46.22  5.23  60.32  4.63  46.90  4.76
no. observations 132 66 66
R-squared 0.778  0.813  0.903
S.E. of regression 0.265  0.209  0.176
Mean dep. variable 0.307  0.328  0.276
F-statistic 17.38  8.493  8.568
Note: The dependent variable is the targeting differential given by the regression coefficient
of Trabajar spending per capita at department level for each province and time period on
the incidence of unmet basic needs per capita. The observation period for each of TII and
TIII was divided into three five month-intervals (one six month interval for TIII, converted
into a five month equivalent); a statistical addendum with details is available from the
author. The t-ratios are based on White standard errors.
Table 4. (Continued) Budget Effects on Poor-Area Targeting of
Argentina’s Trabajar Programs
                                     Full sample             Trabajar II           Trabajar III
coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio coeffcient t-ratio
Variable
The regression coefficient of the targeting differential on program spending
is 3.13 for the combined samples. So a $10 cut in spending reduced the
targeting differential by $3.13 on average. For TII, the regression coefficient
of the targeting differential on program spending is 3.55. For TIII, the estimated
regression coefficient rises to 10.22. So not only has targeting performance117 ARE THE POOR PROTECTED FROM BUDGET CUTS?
deteriorated in the change from TII to TIII, but the effect of changes in program
spending on targeting performance has increased under TIII.
The budget neutral TD for TII is positive in 18 of the 22 provinces, and
significantly so (at the 5% level or better) in 14 of those; there is one province
(Buenos Aires) in which the budget neutral TD is significantly negative. Under
TIII, the province effects are now positive in all except one province, and are
statistically significant in 18 provinces.
There is a high correlation between the budget-neutral TD’s for TII and
TIII (r = 0.88).  However, it is notable that the budget-neutral TD’s are generally
higher for TIII.  The weaker targeting performance of TIII largely vanishes if
one controls for the difference in budget allocation. Indeed, the targeting
performance of TIII would generally be better than that of TII if both had the
same disbursement rate over time for each province. Thus the decline in
targeting performance can be attributed entirely to the decline in spending.
The theoretical model in Ravallion (2000a) offers some clues as to why
we observe a deterioration in targeting performance with cuts, and an
improvement with program expansion. A long-standing concern about any
program such as Trabajar is that poor municipalities have a harder time raising
the cofinancing required for the sub-projects. A provincial government that
wants to influence which municipalities participate can readily do so through
its ability to propose and cofinance projects. In some provinces, it is clear
that the provincial government is active in proposing projects in the capital
city so as to placate vocal well-organized groups. The workers involved may
well be just as poor as those in poorer municipalities outside the capital city.
However, to assure maximum impact on poverty it is still preferable for the
assets created by the program to be in poor areas.
The political economy of the program’s operation in most provinces
entailed that the cuts were borne heavily by poor areas. The cofinancing
requirements allow considerable provincial discretion in the geographic
allocation of program spending. Discussions with a number of the provincial
project managers and staff suggested that it was politically difficult in a number
of provinces to assure that the cuts came only from non-poor areas. This118 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
reflected (in part) the fact that the program was already favoring poor areas,
and so there was little slack for cutting heavily elsewhere while still leaving
sufficiently broad participation.
Given these pervasive local political-economy constraints, we can begin
to understand why lower disbursements resulted in worse performance in
reaching poor areas. When a program such as this is cut, there is little obvious
saving, via project financing, to non-poor areas. The program has negligible
cost-recovery from non-poor areas, even for sub-projects in those areas. Low
cost-recovery (at the margin) of program benefits in non-poor areas leaves
the poor more exposed to cuts. Also it is not implausible that marginal benefits
to the non-poor were quite high; the initially high degree of targeting implied
low allocations to non-poor areas and so probably high marginal benefits.
The fact that the program provided work to poor neighbors in non-poor areas
presumably also entailed indirect benefits to the non-poor. Under these
conditions, sub-projects in non-poor areas would have to be protected from
cuts to avoid a welfare loss to the non-poor.
One can argue that all this helped assure this program’s success in helping
the poor in the crisis. While the program was clearly well targeted (to both
poor workers and poor communities), it was almost certainly not a political
equilibrium to assure that only poor areas participated. The other side of the
coin to good targeting, was that the (relatively modest) spending on the non-
poor had to be protected from cuts.
V. Conclusions
Aggregate budget cuts in Argentina during the 1980s and ‘90s typically
resulted in proportionately greater cuts in social spending; it was “non-social”
spending that was protected. However, the proportionate cuts were about the
same for types of social spending that matter more to the poor as for those
that tend to favor the non-poor. The absolute cuts were in fact greater for
“social insurance” that matters more to the non-poor.
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was more vulnerable to aggregate spending cuts than more universal social
services. While social spending as a whole was clearly exposed to fiscal
contraction, this was somewhat less true of pro-poor spending on things that
benefited the non-poor too. Fine targeting may thus be a mixed blessing for
the poor; a higher mean may come with greater vulnerability to cuts — and
quite possibly the cuts will come at times when help is most needed. There is
a strong case for action to protect pro-poor social spending at such times.
The paper studied one program that attempted to do so, namely the Trabajar
Program.  This was introduced to help compensate poor unemployed workers
and their families for the effects of a macroeconomic shock. The design
features of the program — providing low wage work targeted to poor
communities — helped assure that the program was far better at reaching the
poor than the pre-existing components of social spending in Argentina.
The program was clearly subject to the same constraints in the political
economy that influenced the incidence of past fiscal contractions in Argentina.
The program expanded into poor areas when the budget increased, but it
retreated from poor areas when the program was cut. It was the program’s
disbursements to non-poor areas that were protected. Given the low wage
rate offered, the direct benefits from the work are still very likely to have
favored the poor, even after the cuts. So the design features of the program
undoubtedly helped protect the poor from cuts.
In conclusion, the time series data for Argentina suggest that action to
support pro-poor sending at times of aggregate fiscal contraction is warranted.
Social spending in general, and targeted social spending in particular, took a
heavy hit at times of fiscal austerity. The add-on program studied here was
able to achieve far more pro-poor targeting than pre-existing social spending.
The new program was clearly not immune to the same underlying forces in
the political economy that help protect spending on the non-poor from
aggregate fiscal contractions. But the program helped the families of poor
unemployed workers at a time of need; given the pattern of past public
spending, it appears unlikely they would have received such help otherwise.120 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
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